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Abstract
This article analyses the rise in the national minimum wage (nMW) in 2017 in Spain, 
drawing on information provided by the Social Security administrative labour records 
(MCVL). The results suggest this rise may have had an adverse effect on the probability 
of the group of workers with wages below the new minimum wage keeping their jobs. 
This effect would be of particular importance for older workers. The rise approved for the 
nMW in 2019 is far higher than those observed in the past, which considerably increases 
the number of workers affected and the uncertainty surrounding the adverse effects on the 
probability of them keeping their jobs. According to the estimates presented in this article, 
these negative effects could be significant.
Keywords: minimum wage, employment, employment-to-unemployment flows.
JEL classification: J23, J30, J38.
Resumen
En este artículo se analiza la subida del salario mínimo interprofesional (SMI) en 2017 
en España, a partir de la información proporcionada por la Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales. Los resultados indican que dicha subida habría tenido un efecto negativo sobre 
la probabilidad de mantener el empleo entre el colectivo de trabajadores con salarios por 
debajo del nuevo salario mínimo, que sería especialmente importante para los trabajadores 
de más edad. La subida aprobada para el SMI en 2019 es muy superior a las observadas 
en el pasado, lo que eleva considerablemente el número de trabajadores afectados y 
la incertidumbre en torno a los efectos negativos sobre la probabilidad de mantener su 
empleo. De acuerdo con las estimaciones presentadas en este artículo, estos efectos 
negativos podrían ser significativos.
Palabras clave: salario mínimo, empleo, transiciones empleo-desempleo.
Códigos JEL: J23, J30, J38.
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1 Introduction
The economic crisis considerably reduced the labour income of the lower-paid population. This was 
due chiefly to a decline in their hours worked, as a result of the heavy job destruction, the shortening 
of the new temporary contracts and the increase in part-time hiring. That is a key factor for explaining 
the rise in per capita income inequality in Spain, from 2008 to 2014 [see Anghel et al (2018)]. Lower 
labour income was accompanied by an increase in the indicators of relative poverty and, therefore, 
by growing concern about the sufficiency of the income levels of the groups with fewest resources. 
Against this background, in late 2016 the Government approved a rise in the national 
Minimum Wage (nMW) of 8% for 2017, which was followed by a further increase of 4% in early 
2018, placing the nMW at €735.9. As with those in the 2004-2009 period, the main grounds 
for these rises was to recover the purchasing power lost by the nMW since 1980, which was 
achieved following the increase implemented in 2018. For 2019, the government has approved 
an additional rise of 22.3%, to €900 payable in 14 instalments per annum, marking the biggest 
increase made to the nMW in Spain since 1978 (see Chart 1).1 
The aim of this paper is, first, to present the empirical evidence and the theoretical 
arguments available on the impact of increases in the nMW on different dimensions relating to 
households and firms. Second, it analyses the impact of the rise approved in 2017 on the probability 
of the group of workers who had wages in 2016 below the new nMW losing their jobs. This part 
of the analysis pays particular attention to differences by age group. Finally, in light of these results 
and of the characteristics of the workers whose contract in 2017 was for wages below the nMW 
approved for 2019, we analyse the possible impact of the 22.3% rise this year on the probability of 
job loss, acknowledging the difficulty of performing this extrapolation exercise given the uncertainty 
associated with an nMW increase on an unprecedented scale in Spain.
1  Following the 2017 and 2018 increases, the cumulative rise would be 37.4% between 2016 and 2019, similar to that 
between 2004 and 2009 (35.5%) in nominal terms; however, stripping out inflation, the recent rise would be far higher 
than that between 2004 and 2009 (31.9% as opposed to 21.4%).
SOURCES: Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, and Banco de España.
The NMW rises between 2005 and 2009 and between 2017 and 2018 mean that the NMW has not lost purchasing power in CPI terms between 1980 
and 2018. The nominal 22% rise (21% in real terms) proposed for 2019 is unprecedented, especially in real terms.
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2 Evidence on the effects of rises in the NMW
2.1 General aspects
The economic literature has, drawing on various international experiences over time, extensively 
analysed the effect of changes in the nMW on different groups of workers, taking into consideration 
different variables, both in the short and in the medium term. one initial question the literature 
addresses relates to identifying the population group affected by the minimum wage rise. In this 
respect, there appears to be a consensus that the biggest effects are perceived by low-wage 
workers. For this reason, most studies have focused on groups of low-income workers with a 
higher labour turnover, namely the young, women, the low-skilled and those with a lower level of 
educational attainment or those with a contract in specific areas such as the hotel and catering 
or care sectors. However, there is evidence that rises in the nMW feed through at least in part 
to other groups with higher wages.2 
In any event, one important consideration is that the group of those affected by an 
nMW rise do not necessarily belong to the group of households below the poverty threshold, 
since incidence is high in relative terms among the young, who in many cases have not yet 
decided to leave the family home and do not necessarily belong to households with limited 
resources.3 . This is one of the factors occasionally brandished to question the effectiveness 
of the nMW as a policy for increasing the income of low-income households and its poverty-
reducing capacity.4 In this same vein, some authors argue that the increase in income that an 
nMW rise entails in some households may be partly offset by the loss of some of the public 
transfers these households received prior to the rise. For example, West and Reich (2014) 
and Dube (2018) show a negative impact in terms of transfers received in the United States. 
Despite this, the same study finds a somewhat more positive impact on the average income 
of the household concerned in the medium term. other authors also indicate that not all the 
households affected will see their income increase, since some of them may lose their jobs and 
not find new employment as a result of the associated cost increase.5 The consequences of the 
rise in the nMW for employment will be discussed in greater detail in the following sub-section. 
There is, nevertheless, less literature on the impact of nMW rises on other variables at 
the household level. Consumption is a case in point although, in this respect, the fact that the 
households affected by an nMW rise evidence, on average, a greater marginal propensity to 
consume generally causes the nMW to impact substantially the consumption of those affected 
who keep their job. The recent literature for the United States shows that this latter effect is due, 
in part, to a greater recourse to debt by households that have one or more members receiving 
the nMW in states that increased the nMW compared with other comparable households 
resident in states where the nMW did not increase.6 Further, some authors have pointed out 
2 See Giupponi and Machin (2018) or puente and Vozmediano (2019).
3 See Freeman (1996) or Belman and Wolfson (2014).
4 See Burkhauser and Sabia (2007) and MaCurdy (2015).
5 See neumark (2016).
6 See Aaronson et al (2012), Dettling and Hsu (2017).
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that the possible positive impact on consumption may be partly offset by the feed-through of 
nMW rises to prices, whereby household purchasing power would not increase so much.7 The 
reason is that sectors more intensive in workers who receive the nMW are usually more exposed 
to competition as they do not offer specialised products or services, and they therefore tend 
to pass through the increase in costs in its virtual entirety to prices.8 Macurdy (2015) indicates 
moreover that this pass-through to prices of the nMW mainly harms population groups with 
fewer resources, since the products affected by the price rise are usually goods traditionally 
consumed by this group. Access to better data at the household level would enable more 
analysis to be performed on the direct impact of the nMW on household income and poverty 
levels, and of its indirect impact on such important variables as household consumption and 
investment decisions, including human capital considerations such as level of educational 
attainment or children’s health within the household.9 
Another relevant issue in this literature is the time over which the effects of the 
nMW rise can be noted. While most papers have analysed the immediate effects of different 
variables to changes in the nMW, it cannot be ruled out that these effects may appear 
in the medium term. Hence, Baker, Benjamin and Stangen (1999), with data for Canada 
from 1975 to 1993, find that NMW rises in certain regions, while not exerting a significant 
effect on their related youth employment rate immediately, did reduce it over the course of 
five years.10 Fernández-Villaverde (2018) justifies this lagged effect, citing three reasons: 
firstly, the reorganisation of productive factors entailing a certain lapse of time; secondly, 
the destruction of firms that may take place after a measure of this type, as a result of 
growing costs over time; and finally, the outcome of an innovation process which, in the 
medium term, generates new unskilled labour-saving productive processes11. In addition, 
and thinking of the indirect long-term effects of nMW rises, Bárány (2016) and Fernández-
Villaverde (2018) suggest that the disincentive to pursue an education, as a consequence 
of a higher wage independent of training, would offset the positive income effect on the 
demand for education. 
2.2 Effects on the labour market 
The most commonly analysed issue in the literature has been the effect of the nMW on 
the employment rate of the workers potentially affected. In theoretical terms, a standard 
labour supply and demand model predicts that a rise in the cost of labour derived from 
an NMW increase tends to reduce firms’ demand for labour [Stigler (1946)]. Under certain 
circumstances, such as when a firm has monopsonistic power when setting wages, a rise 
in the nMW may boost the participation of certain workers in the labour market, thereby 
generating a possible positive effect on employment [Card and Krueger (1994), Flinn (2006), 
Ahn et al (2011)].  
7  Aaronson (2001), Aaronson and French (2005), MacDonald and Aaronson (2006).
8   For the same reason, there seems to be no relevant effect on the profits of the companies most affected [Card and 
Krueger (1994), Draca et al (2011)].
9  See Hill y Romich (2017) for a discussion on the impact of income on these variables.
10 See also Belman and Wolfson (2010).
11 See Sorkin (2015).
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These different theoretical arguments have been used to explain the fact that the 
evidence available is not conclusive with respect to the impact of nMW rises on employment, 
since a high variety of results has been found for different countries, groups of workers and 
moments in time. Recently, for instance, Belman and Wolfson (2014) and Giotis and Chletsos 
(2015) have compiled the results of an extensive number of studies, most of which for the US 
labour market, finding negative effects on employment in almost two-thirds of them, and positive 
effects in the remaining third. In any event, the scale of this impact is relatively limited, with an 
elasticity of aggregate employment to the minimum wage of around -0.1% on average; that 
said, the comparison of elasticities among studies that analyse different groups of workers, 
minimum wage rises of a very different magnitude and in different macroeconomic and labour 
market situations is very complicated. Thus, this elasticity is usually higher for specific groups 
of workers, such as the lesser-skilled12, partly because this is a group more exposed to the 
elimination of routine jobs that are more readily automatable.13 
Recent studies, based on individual information on those directly affected, are not fully 
conclusive either. For example, Clemens and Wither (2016) find negative effects of the rises 
carried out between 2007 and 2009 in the United States, and Abowd et al (2000) show greater 
job destruction for those affected by the nMW rises in France from 1982 to 1989. on the other 
hand, Cengiz et al (2018) and Stewart (2004), analysing an extensive sample of rises between 
1979 and 2016 in the United States and the introduction of the nMW in the United Kingdom in 
1999, respectively, do not find negative effects.14 In this respect, it is desirable to increase the 
number of studies analysing the career details of the workers affected with individual longitudinal 
data in order to better understand why different empirical strategies offer different results.15 
With regard to other labour market facets, such as the participation rate or 
unemployment, there is also evidence on both sides. Despite this, most evidence suggests a 
slight increase in both variables in reaction to an increase in the nMW.16 There is an additional 
aspect to be taken into account; given that the labour market institutional framework differs from 
country to country and, moreover, that the effects of nMW rises of a different magnitude may not 
be linear within the same economy, past international evidence cannot be readily extrapolated to 
rises applied in different labour markets, moments in time or of very different magnitudes.
The relatively moderate effect on aggregate employment that is usually found in the 
foregoing papers is consistent with the recent evidence on the effect of changes in the nMW on 
employment inflows and outflows. According to Belman and Wolfson (2014), there is evidence 
of a general negative impact on both flows. In this respect, the increase in the minimum wage 
would have an adverse effect on job creation and, under certain circumstances, it might also 
12 See neumark et al (2014).
13 See Lordan y neumark (2017) and Even and Mcpherson (2018).
14  other papers do not focus on employment, but on the number of hours worked [see Belman and Wolfson (2010) for 
the NMW rise in the United States in 1998, finding a negative though minor effect in the number of hours, and Caliendo 
et al (2018), who show a decline in the number of hours worked in Germany as a response to the recent nMW rise]. 
15 See neumark (2018), who sets out a list of questions on which more detailed analysis is required.
16 See Belman and Wolfson (2014) for a summary of some of the papers relating to this matter. 
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bring about a decline in job destruction.17 This latter effect might arise at those firms which, while 
remaining active following the nMW rise, are obliged to assign more resources to examining new 
candidates. As a result, they prefer to maintain the employment relationship with their current 
workers, reducing dismissals. This latter point is, moreover, also in the interest of the worker, 
who takes it as given that in the new situation it will be more difficult to find a new job. 
However, on the flow of job loss, the evidence is not conclusive. Various recent papers 
that analyse the working trajectory of workers affected by an NMW rise find that this group 
moves with greater probability towards a non-employment situation relative to other comparable 
groups not affected.18 The following section analyses how the nMW rise in Spain in 2017 
affected this transition, and on the basis of the results an extrapolation is made to analyse the 
implications of the proposed rise for 2019. 
17  See Brochu and Green (2003) for Canada, portugal and Cardoso (2006) for portugal and Dube et al (2016) for the 
United States.
18 See Clemens and Wither (2014) for the United States, and Galán and puente (2015) for Spain.
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3  Estimation of the effects of the 2017 NMW rise on job loss and implications for the 
new 2019 rise 
The nMW was raised by 8% in 2017, rising from €655.20/month in 2016 to €707.60/month 
one year later.19 This rise, which entailed a 6% increase in real terms once inflation was stripped 
out, came about following a period since 2011 in which the nMW had been practically stable. 
Applying the methodology of Galán and puente (2015) to the data provided by the MCVL 
between 2013 and 2017, it is possible, first, to identify which group is receiving a wage in 2016 
below the nMW proposed for 2017; and further, for that group, to estimate the effects of this 
rise on the probability of being employed after one year, bearing in mind the effect of conditioning 
factors other than the nMW.20
According to the MCVL data, the percentage of workers affected by the nMW rise 
proposed for 2017 amounted to 2.4% of the sample total.21 This relatively low level of incidence 
is partly due to the fact that collective bargaining places low wage levels somewhat above 
the legal reference. In any event, this aggregate figure differed substantially across different 
demographic groups. Hence, while for the over-45s such incidence did not reach 1%, for the 
youngest cohort (16-24-year-olds) it exceeded 20%. 
To estimate the isolated impact of the nMW rise on the group of those affected, the MCVL 
offers full month-by-month information on the working life of each individual. With this information 
it is possible to observe, for each person employed in a specific month of 2016, their employment 
status in the same month of the following year, i.e. once the new minimum wage was in force. To 
consider the person employed in the related month of 2017, it is only necessary that this person 
should have worked at least one day during that month. Accordingly, possible changes in the hours 
actually worked arising from a reduction in the working day are not considered, as is neither the 
effect on the employment-to-unemployment flows there may be within each year analysed for each 
worker. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the exercise does not directly address the effect of the 
NMW on the unemployment rate, but focuses exclusively on employment-to-unemployment flows. 
other potentially relevant factors, which are not analysed here since the necessary information is 
lacking, would be the consequences of an increase in the nMW on unemployment-to-employment 
flows, and the probabilities of re-employment after being dismissed. 
It should be clarified that, in order to isolate the effect of the minimum wage on employment-
to-unemployment flows, it does not suffice to quantify the number of workers who lost their jobs from 
one year to the next. That is because job loss, especially in the group of low-wage workers, may be 
19  In 14 monthly payments. In terms of 12 instalments, the minimum wage rose from €764.40 in 2016 to €825.60 in 2017.
20  The MCVL provides information on working trajectories and the contribution bases for a sample representing 4% of 
workers. To identify workers with minimum wages below the nMW proposed for the following year, information on 
full-time wage-earners who have worked each day of a specific month is used. In this way, monthly income is not 
conditional upon the type of working day, the information on which is subject to measurement error in the MCVL, or 
upon the number of days worked in the month. 
21  That is to say, they had monthly income of between €764.40 and €825.60 euros, which is the result of prorating 
fourteen monthly payments into twelve. Wage data from InE’s Labour Force Survey (EpA) for 2017 also show low 
incidence of 1.6%. 
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related to other factors, such as the high labour churn, the level of educational attainment, the greater 
incidence on jobs in seasonal sectors, etc. which are not directly associated with the nMW rise. 
Therefore, a comparison is made between the working situation of the group directly affected by the 
nMW rise and that of similar workers in terms of characteristics and wages, but who are not directly 
affected by this rise. This group is called the control group. Specifically, the control group comprises 
workers who, in 2016, received a slightly higher wage than the new minimum wage in 2017, and 
workers who, in the three previous years, received similar real wages but were not affected by a rise in 
the minimum wage, since comparable rises had not come about in those years.22 The specification of 
the empirical model allows the nMW effect to change across different age groups, and on the basis 
of the distance between the wage received and the new legal minimum wage. 
Chart 2 shows the probability of job loss estimated by the model for those affected 
by the rise in minimum wage in 2017. The results of this estimation show a clear positive and 
significant relationship between the probability of job loss and the distance between the wage 
received in 2016 and the new legal minimum wage for 2017. Hence, the probability of not being in 
employment twelve months later for someone receiving the nMW in 2016 was 22.9%, while this 
would have been 17.1% had there not been an increase in the nMW in 2017. The magnitude of this 
22  As regards the first group, the effect of the minimum wage is estimated on the basis of non-linear changes in the 
probability of job loss when comparing job destruction for persons slightly above and below the nMW. As to the 
second group, the effect of the minimum wage is estimated comparing job destruction for workers with the same 
real wage at different moments in time, depending on whether there have been nMW increases or not. For this latter 
comparison, it is important to assume that all the remaining macroeconomic factors that may affect the probability of 
job loss, year by year, affect all workers in equal measure, irrespective of whether they are above or below this level. For 
greater robustness, the exercise has been performed restricting the sample to workers who receive less than €1,300 
per month, with results practically identical to those presented in this paper being found.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Probability of a worker (General Social Security Regime working 30 days per month full-time) not working any day 12 months later. Probability calculated with a 
logit model controlling for other characteristics of the individual such as age group, sex, Spanish nationality, type of contract (permanent/temporary), real wage, 
multiple employment, household size, and month and year dummy variables to control for cyclical and seasonal effects.
Faced with the 2017 NMW increase, the probability of job loss increases for workers who, in 2016, received wages below the new NMW, increasing all 
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difference varies according to the worker’s age. Thus, for example, for the over-45s receiving the 
nMW in 2016, the probability of job loss would have risen from 14.1%, in the case of no increase 
in the nMW, to 40.9%, after the rise; meanwhile, for the under-25s receiving the nMW in 2016, the 
increase in this probability amounts to 1.6 pp. This latter result suggests that, against a background 
of high productivity gains for the young relative to the elderly, firms in which the former work would 
be more prepared to bear the increase in labour costs to which the nMW increase gave rise. 
Table 1 shows the same results, breaking down the estimated differences by age group 
and moving these individual probabilities to the total workers and average wages of each group. 
Specifically, the second column shows the estimated probability of job loss for each age group 
as a consequence of the rise in the minimum wage in 2017. Within the overall group affected 
by the rise, it is estimated that 3.1% of them lost their jobs, which would be compatible with an 
elasticity of job destruction of the workers affected of -0.5 in relation to a 1 pp rise in the nMW.23 
This probability of job loss varies considerably across age groups. Specifically, it is estimated 
that 10.7% of workers over 45 affected by the rise lost their jobs, a percentage which would fall 
to 0.8% in the under-25s. In any event, given the greater number of workers affected among the 
young, this group would, in absolute terms, be that most affected by the rise in the minimum 
wage in 2017, with a decline in employment of 0.2%. 
In terms of the total job loss prompted by the increase in the nMW (column 3), the 
total effect is estimated at -0.1%; considering approximately 16 million full-time employees, that 
would be compatible with a total of 12,000 workers who would have lost their job on a total of 
384,000 workers affected. This job loss, along with the wage increase in the group that kept 
their jobs, would mean that aggregate wage income would remain practically unchanged. 
23  The NMW rise in real terms, having stripped out inflation, was 6%. This elasticity of job destruction calculated with 
individual data for the workers affected is not comparable with that of other studies whose aim is to estimate the 
elasticity in employment using more aggregated data, as in Belman, and Wolfson (2014). The more aggregated 
elasticities where the persons affected by the NMW are not individually identified are substantially lower. The size of 
the population affected and the amount of the actual rise in wages following the increase in the minimum wage are 
fundamental factors for being able to compare this type of elasticity across different studies [see neumark (2016)].
SOURCES: Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, and Banco de España.
a Estimate of the impact of the 2017 minimum wage rise using 2013-2017 MCVL data, following the methodology of Galán and Puente (2015).
b Full-time workers who have worked the entire month, and who in 2016 received less than the 2017 NMW.
Workers affected 
(b)
Job loss on employment 
of workers affected
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The rise in the nMW to €900 in 14 monthly payments in 2019 will notably raise the 
incidence of workers affected by this measure, compared with past experiences, in which 
the nMW increase was less. The MCVL information (see Table 2), relating to the 2017 wage 
structure, shows that 6.2% of people who worked full-time that year did so for a wage below the 
new 2019 minimum, compared with the figure of 2.4% estimated for the 2017 rise. This number 
rises to 22.5% when the case of new job entrants is analysed. In some groups, the incidence will 
be far higher, e.g. among the young, where one in four full-time workers receives income lower 
than the minimum wage. This incidence will also be higher among women (8.5%, compared 
SOURCES: INE (EPA) and Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social (MCVL).
a Percentage of employees working 30 days per month full-time with a contribution base below the NMW proposed for 2019 (€1,050 in 12 monthly payments). Since 
the Labour Force Survey (EPA) database does not report the numbers of days worked during the month, the paper removed those wages below the corresponding 
2017 minimum wage. It is assumed those wages were errors or related to full-time employees who did not work the whole month.
b General Social Security Regime workers. If workers affiliated to the special rural and maritime regimes are taken into account, the incidence rises to 30.3%.
6.7latoT2.6latoT
xes yBxes yB
0.6elaM    9.4elaM    
7.9elameF    5.8elameF    
ega yBega yB
5.4242-61   6.5242-61   
2.1123-52    9.0123-52    
2.644-33    7.444-33    
3.546-54    0.446-54    
tcartnoc fo epyt yBtcartnoc fo epyt yB
4.41yraropmeT    4.41yraropmeT    
6.5tnenamreP    9.3tnenamreP    
noitacude yBnoitacude yB
2.4rehgiH    6.02 ro 1 puorg noitubirtnoC    
9.9etaidemretnI    4.7 erom o 3 puorg noitubirtnoC    
8.61yramirP    
tnemhsilbatse fo ezis yBtnemhsilbatse fo ezis yB
8.41srekrow 01 naht reweF    8.31srekrow 5-1   
0.6srekrow 94-11    8.7srekrow 01-6    
8.3srekrow 942-05    6.5srekrow 05-11    
4.2srekrow erom ro 052    4.4srekrow 001-15    
9.7srekrow 01 naht erom tub ,wonk t'noD   0.3srekrow 001 naht eroM    
6.01wonk t'noD    
ytivitca fo rotces yBytivitca fo rotces yB
1.82erutlucirgA    1.11e (b)rutlucirgA    
4.3yrtsudnI    7.2yrtsudnI    
9.3noitcurtsnoC    9.2noitcurtsnoC    
4.01secivres tekraM    7.7secivres tekraM    
6.3secivres tekram-noN    9.6secivres tekram-noN    
MCVL data 
INCIDENCE OF THE PROPOSED 2019 NMW INCREASE (a) TABLE 2
As a % As a %
The greatest incidence of the proposed 2019 NMW increase is among the young, temporary employees, those with a low level of education, and in small 
establishments.
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with 4.9% among men). notable among the sectors with the highest incidence are agriculture 
(11.1%), a figure that would be even higher if workers under the Rural and Maritime Regime24 
were considered, and market services (7.7%). There are also differences in incidence depending 
on whether the province is orense (15.5%), Santa Cruz de Tenerife (13.9%) or Badajoz (12.4%); 
it is these which evidence the highest incidence. 
The foregoing figures are generally consistent with those obtained using the wage 
information from the 2017 Labour Force Survey (EpA), where a somewhat higher incidence 
of the approved 2019 nMW rise is observed (7.6%). The EpA information helps identify 
the fact that the minimum wage rise particularly affects certain groups, such as those with 
a lower education (16.8%), certain occupations such as those in agriculture (28.1%) and 
certain services such as those associated with accommodation and food service activities 
and the distributive trade, cleaning staff, labourers and kitchen staff. As regards specific 
characteristics that might affect the ultimate incidence of this measure on employment, it 
should be noted that 50% of full-time workers with a minimum wage of below €900 in 14 
monthly payments have a temporary contract, and 40% are engaged in work centres with 
fewer than five workers. 
Table 3 shows the outcome of projecting the results estimated in 2017 onto the 
distribution of workers affected by the new rise for 2019. note that an increase of 22.3%, like 
that approved for this year, is unprecedented in Spain, which is why the projection involves a 
high degree of uncertainty. The second column of Table 3 shows the job losses associated with 
the rise in the minimum wage for all workers affected and by age group. It is estimated that, 
overall, 12.7% of the workers affected would lose their job as a result of the rise in the minimum 
wage, clearly above the estimates of 3.1% for 2017. That reflects the greater magnitude of the 
wage rise approved for 2019. These estimates would be compatible with an elasticity of job 
destruction of -0.6 among the group of workers affected.25 As was the case in 2017, the impact 
would be more acute for the oldest affected workers, with destruction of 28% of employment 
being estimated among the over-45s affected. 
The third column of Table 3 shows the aggregate results on job destruction and wages. 
The greater probability of job loss arising from the nMW rise for 2019, along with the greater 
incidence in relation to that estimated in 2017, would raise the impact on job loss for full-time 
dependent workers for 2019 to 0.8%. Considering approximately 16 million full-time employees, 
the elasticity of -0.6 for the 1 million workers affected would be compatible with job losses of 
around 125,000 workers.
24  This figure refers to agricultural workers affiliated to the General Social Security Regime, the group used to estimate 
the impact of the NMW in this paper. If workers affiliated to the Rural and Maritime Regime are also considered, the 
incidence would be far higher (30.3%).
25  The real rise in the nMW to calculate elasticity is 21%. note that if we calculated elasticity for a more aggregated group 
instead of for those affected, elasticity would be much smaller, e.g. the elasticity of aggregated job loss for a 1 pp rise 
in the NMW would be -0.04. As discussed in the previous section, therein lies one of the main difficulties of comparing 
elasticities from different studies, since they usually relate to different groups of workers (those affected, the young, 
workers from specific sectors, total employment).
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In any event, when interpreting these estimates regard must be had to the high 
uncertainty associated with extrapolating results from this exercise to total employment. Firstly, 
the estimation of the impact on job loss is with historical evidence that had never seen an nMW 
increase on this scale. Secondly, the elasticity used in this estimation has not been calculated 
for net aggregate employment but solely for the group of workers already employed prior to 
the nMW rise. Hence, effects on job creation and the re-employment of the unemployed are 
obviated. Further, in this case it should be borne in mind that, since small numbers are involved, 
the consequence of modest changes in the estimated elasticity would be substantial changes in 
the number of workers who lose their jobs. For instance, each tenth of a point above or below 
the estimated value for elasticity would raise or reduce job loss by around 20,000 workers. 
Finally, note that the study has been conducted for the group of workers affected that are 
clearly identifiable using the MCVL, without extrapolating to the group of workers with reduced 
working hours and to the self-employed, which leaves some three million workers not having 
been analysed. Hence, if this exercise is used to make an extrapolation to the total population of 
the employed, some assumption of incidence must be added to these groups.26 
As to the effect on total income, the higher wages of those who keep their job would 
be offset, approximately, by the wages that those workers losing their jobs would cease to 
receive. As a result, the total wage bill would be left relatively unchanged. That would mean 
some increase in the degree of inequality of the distribution of labour income among different 
groups of workers, namely an additional 0.2% in terms of the Gini index, once both the wage 
gains of those affected by the rise who keep their jobs and the wage income losses of those who 
would lose their jobs are taken into account.
26  If a zero impact on the jobs of the self-employed group and the same for the reduced-hours and full-time groups were 
assumed, employment destruction relative to total employment would be 0.7%.
SOURCES: Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, and Banco de España.
a Microsimulation based on the re-estimation with 2013-2017 MCVL data, following the methodology of Galán and Puente (2015) and taking the MCVL 2017 wage 
structure.
b Workers in 2017 receiving less than the proposed 2019 NMW (€900 per month in 14 payments, equivalent to €1,050 per month in 12 payments).
As a %
Workers affected (b)
Job loss on 
employment of 
workers affected






    16-24 25.5 -2.2 -0.6 2.4 3.0
    25-32 10.8 -1.6 -0.2 0.7 0.9
    33-44 4.7 -15.9 -0.7 -0.1 0.6
    45-64 3.9 -28.0 -1.1 -0.3 0.8
    16-64 6.2 -12.7 -0.8 0.0 0.8
segaw no tcapmItnemyolpme no tcapmI
TABLE 3IMPACT OF THE 2019 MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES DERIVED FROM ESTIMATED
JOB DESTRUCTION (a)
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4 Conclusions
Different analyses have shown that there was a considerable increase in income inequality 
in Spain during the crisis. This increase essentially reflected the acute rise in unemployment, 
the shortening of new temporary contracts and the reduction in hours worked, which were 
concentrated in the groups of low-wage workers, with no appreciable widening of hourly wage 
differences during this period having been discernible. Comparisons at the international level 
actually show that these differences are not particularly high relative to those observed in other 
countries. Against this background, it would be desirable to base income inequality-alleviating 
policies on tools that intensified job creation and reduced temporary working arrangements 
among certain groups, such as the low-skilled and the long-term unemployed, who have been 
particularly affected since the onset of the crisis. 
one strand of the literature has also pointed out that an increase in the nMW may 
be a useful tool for increasing the income of lower-income households, partly on account of 
the administrative simplicity involved and because of the limited budgetary impact on public 
finances.27 However, other papers have raised doubts about the effectiveness of this instrument 
for increasing lower-income workers’ wages and reducing poverty. As a result, the evidence 
available in this respect is not conclusive. 
The assessment conducted in this paper on the impact of the rise in the minimum wage 
in 2017 in Spain shows a negative effect on the probability of the group of workers affected 
keeping their jobs, a development of particular relevance for older workers. The increase in the 
minimum wage approved for 2019, to €900 in 14 annual payments, would be one of 22.3%, 
far higher than those observed in the past in the Spanish economy. This increase would raise 
the number of workers affected to clearly higher figures than those observed in previous rises 
(between 6% according to the MCVL and almost 8% according to the EpA). The incidence 
would be particularly high in certain groups, such as women, the young, the lesser-skilled and 
employees on temporary contracts. A simulation of the potential impact of the rise considered 
for 2019, using the estimates made drawing on the 2017 experience, suggests – despite being 
subject to high uncertainty as there are no previous comparable rises – that the impact on the 
probability of job loss would be clearly higher than that estimated for 2017. In light of these 
results, it would be advisable to monitor in detail the effects of the nMW rise approved for 2019; 
in that way, should the risks posed in this paper materialise, effective action could be taken in 
respect of the workers affected, with the aim of increasing their employability. 
27 See Dolado et al (2000).
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